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FOUNDATIONAL FACTS, RELATIVE TRUTHS: A
COMPARATIVE LAW STUDY ON CHILDREN'S RIGHT TO
KNOW THEIR GENETIC ORIGINS, by Richard J. Blauwhoff'
JULIET R. GUICHON 2
PEOPLE CONCEIVED WITH DONOR GAMETES are coming of age in greater num-
bers. Many do not know about their unusual conception and have been led to
believe their social parents are also their genetic parents.
Do individuals have a right to know the truth about their origins? Ought
they to have? These questions, unresolved in Canada, may be better answered
now with the publication of the thoughtful and dispassionate work of Richard
J. Blauwhoff, Foundational Facts, Relative Truths: A Comparative Law Study on
Children's Right to Know Their Genetic Origins.3
This long book is the publication of Blauwhoff's award-winning doctoral
dissertation. Recognized in 2009 by the Erasmus Research Prize and the
Dutch-German Lawyers Prize, the work is an ambitious and largely successful
in-depth comparative law analysis of the right to information about one's pro-
genitors in four European countries: France, Germany, the Netherlands, and
Portugal. The book aims to delineate the conceptual and procedural scope of
the right to know one's origins and to articulate the philosophical basis upon
which such a right is founded in the nations under examination. It focuses on
the issue from the perspective of the donor-conceived.
1. (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2009) 461 pages.
2. BA, BCL, MA, SJD; Called to the Bar of Ontario; Department of Community Health
Sciences; Office of Medical Bioethics; Faculty of Medicine, University of Calgary.
3. Supra note 1.
4. Intersentia Publishing, "Foundational Facts, Relative Truths," online: <http://www.
intersentia.com/searchDetail.aspx?back=reeks&reeksCode=&bookid= 101173>.
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The author chose these four European jurisdictions not just because of-his
(impressive) linguistic skills,' but also because the jurisdictions exhibit a range
of legal responses. France currently permits "anonymous" births (according to
which the child receives no information about its progenitors),' whereas Ger-
many "has been at the forefront in the recognition of the right to know one's
origins."' The Netherlands is moving toward a right to know with its Donor
Anonymity Act,' which requires registration of gamete providers.! Portugal, on
the other hand, passed legislation in 2007" which does not grant the donor-
conceived a right to know their origins, even as the country is moving toward
the German model."
The book is both ambitious and sufficiently lengthy to realize its ambi-
tions. It is comprised of five parts and eleven chapters. Part I explains why the
subject is worthy of study in a comprehensive discussion entitled, "Unknown
Origins, Biological Truth." Part II describes the constitutional legal framework
internationally (chapter two), regionally (chapter three), and nationally (chapter
four). (The international section addresses extensively the United Nations Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child'2). Adopting the functional, or problem-
solving, method of comparative law analysis, part III delineates a legal frame-
work for a comparative analysis of the right to know in a single chapter that
searches for guiding principles. Part IV engages in a thematic comparison of
national law concerning the identification of the birth mother (chapter six), the
identification of the father (chapter seven), the procedural issues in parenting
5. The author understates this skill. When describing the limitations of his work, Blauwhoff
apologizes: "[T]he author had too little time at his disposal to learn Scandinavian
languages with a view to conducting an in-depth comparative law research." See
Blauwhoff, supra note 1 at 37.
6. Ibid. at 81.
7. Ibid. at 32.
8. Kingdom of the Netherlands, Law of25 April 2002, Concerning Rules fr the Preservation,
Management, and Supply of Data of Gamete Donors (Law Regarding Donor Data in Artificial
fecundation), Bulletin of Acts, Orders and Decrees of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 2002,
240, 1-5 [translated by reviewer].
9. Ibid at 33.
10. The Parliament of Portugal, Portuguese Law ofMedically Assisted Procreation 32/2006; Series
Dr I 143/X/1, 26 July 2006 [translated by reviewer].
11. Ibid.
12. 20 November 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
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proceedings (chapter eight), the identification of the birth parents in adoption
(chapter nine), and the right to information in the contexts of artificial repro-
ductive technologies and "surrogate" motherhood (chapter ten). Accepting that
truth is incontrovertible, the book concludes by considering whether the cur-
rent legal structures effectively meet the informational needs of children who
may wish to establish the identity of their genetic or gestational parents.
Perhaps the book's strongest contribution is its very approach. It begins
historically by noting that the desire to know one's origins is hardly new: Aris-
tode in his Metaphysics stated that the desire to seek knowledge separates humans
from other species." Yet the desire to know one's origins began to crystallize as
a legal interest only in the 1980s, when the identification of DNA became pos-
sible and some adoptees born in the 1950s and 60s began to insist upon the
importance of knowing their identities. Then, in 1989 came what Blauwhoff
calls a "watershed"" moment in the global recognition of identity rights: the
1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 7 of the
Convention states that a child has the right "as far as possible ... to know and be
cared for by his or her parents."" Moreover, Article 8, in establishing the right
of a child to preserve his or her "identity, including nationality, name and
family relations,"" adopts a broad understanding of "identity." Neither Article
establishes absolute rights; indeed, the rights established find qualification in
the wording of the articles themselves. Nevertheless, the articles are powerful
international recognition that identity matters. Also in 1989, the European
Court of Human Rights gave impetus to the trend toward permitting persons
to know about their origins. In Gaskin v. United Kingdom," the European Court of
Human Rights held that the lack of access to information concerning the appli-
cant's childhood, development, and history raised issues under Article 8 of the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and -Fundamental Freedoms,
which states, inter alia, that "Everyone has the right to respect for his private
13. Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. Ross, Book I, Part 1, online: The Internet Classics Archive
<http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/metaphysics. Li.html>.
14. Supra note I at 43.
15. Supra note 12.
16. Ibid.
17. (1989), 160 E.C.H.R. (Ser. A), 12 E.H.R.R. 36 at para. 49 [Gaskin].
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and family life, his home and his correspondence."" The European Court of
Human Rights further stated that an "independent authority" must be available
to assess claims regarding access to information about a person's personal iden-
tity." (Currently, records that would identify a person's progenitor tend to be
held by medical clinics or sperm banks.)
In moving from international to domestic law, Blauwhoff is perhaps most
insightful. In his examination of German, French, Netherlands, and Portuguese
domestic codes and judgments, he identifies three principles that underpin the
interpretation and application of law in this field: decisional privacy, procrea-
tional responsibility, and equality. Decisional privacy is recognized in Germany,
the Netherlands, and Portugal as a dimension of the right to personality, a right
to informational self-determination. This right includes the right not to know
one's biological parentage. Procreational responsibility includes the parental ob-
ligation to recognize that some duty of disclosure exists. Equality entails recog-
nition that children ought not to be treated unequally with respect to
important interests; this right could operate where the state plays an active role
in making it impossible for someone to know one's origins. Blauwhoff asserts,
"such an argument could be mounted [where] the state rigidly insists upon en-
suring lifelong anonymity of the donor."2
Thus, Blauwhoff focuses on legal developments-internationally, region-
ally, and nationally-to determine how the legal interest in knowing one s ori-
gins is protected and how countervailing forces limit protection of that interest.
He identifies the principles that arguably elucidate both protection and refusal
to protect the right to know one's origins. In so doing, Blauwhoff suggests that
the trend is toward increasing openness.
Blauwhoffs work contributes to the body of literature most obviously be-
cause his careful efforts are undertaken from the perspective of the resulting
child. Early and even present-day discussion of this subject can be dominated
by understandable concern for the needs and wants of those who wish to have a
child but who are unable or unwilling to do so in a heterosexual relationship.
(Some such people have physical limitations that prevent them from conceiving
18. Convention for the Protection ofHuman Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950,
213 U.N.T.S. 221 at 223, Eur. T.S. 5 [European Convention on Human Rights].
19. Gaskin, supra note 17.
20. Blauwhoff, supra note I at 160.
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naturally, some have no heterosexual partner, and some are not heterosexual.)
These adults have interests which they and the medical establishment articulate.
Such articulation can guide law and policy.
But whether the interests of these adults ought to guide law and policy in
assisted human reproduction has been challenged relatively unsuccessfully in
North America since at least as long ago as 1980 when George Annas wrote his
important article, "Fathers Anonymous: Beyond the Best Interests of the Sperm
Donor."21 Annas lamented the fact that even though there were then an esti-
mated 250,000 children born of assisted insemination in the United States,
these Americans would be unable to know the identities of their genetic fathers
because "of an exaggeration of potential legal pitfalls and a failure to pay suffi-
cient attention to the best interests of the ... child."22 Blauwhoff s work follows
in this offspring-focused tradition.
Consider, for example, Blauwhoffs devastating analysis of the European
Court of Human Rights decision in Odi~vre v. France.23 In that case, Pascale
Odi~vre, born in France in 1965 to a mother who wished to remain anony-
mous, made a claim based on Article 8 of the European Convention on Human
Rights, which articulates the right to respect for a person's private and family
life.2" The applicant argued that Article 8 granted her the right to know the
identity of her birth mother. She was not successful. Blauwhoff not only de-
scribes the judgment denying that claim, but highlights the oddity of the
judges' decision, which was based, in part, on the interests of the adoptive fam-
ily, despite the fact that it cannot be inferred that the adoptive family had op-
posed the applicant's claim.25 Moreover, Blauwhoff claims that the "outright
disdain for the applicant's wish to know her genetic descent"26 was barely
masked by the words of adjudicator Judge Rees, who wrote, "Persons who seek
disclosure at any price, even against the express will of their natural mother,
21. George J. Annas, "Fathers Anonymous: Beyond the Best Interests of the Sperm Donor" (1980)
14 Fam. L.Q. 1 at 1.
22. Ibid
23. [GC], no. 42326/98, (2004) 38 E.H.RR 43.
24. Supra note 18.
25. Blauwhoff, supra note 1 at 83.
26. Ibid at 84.
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must ask themselves whether they would have been born had it not been for the
right to give birth anonymously." 27
The suggestion that children ought to be grateful for life itself and not
complain about the complicity of a legal system in denying them knowledge of
their kin is an example of what social scientist Joanna Rose calls "disenfran-
chised grief."28 Not only is the grief people suffer unacknowledged, the sufferers
are chastised for experiencing it. Jurisprudence that lacks insight into this prob-
lem is unbalanced for privileging the needs and wants of adults over those of
children who may have an entirely different perspective. As one donor-
conceived person wrote, "It can be hard to come to terms with a deliberate ac-
tion, endorsed by the State and executed by the medical establishment, which
has cut one off from one's natural family... . Feelings of anger and dislocation
do not stem from ingratitude, but from pain."29
The privileging of adult wants and needs continues today. In its October
2009 analysis of the ethics of embryo donation, the American Society for Re-
productive Medicine (ASRM) Ethics Committee focuses exclusively on the in-
terests of those who wish to conceive using the gametes of others." In
concluding that embryo donation should not be considered at all like adoption,
the ASRM Ethics Committee states that "the experience of embryo donation
more closely approximates normal human reproduction than it does traditional
legal adoption.""' Yet, the Ethics Committee statement does not address whose
"experience" it is privileging. Like adoptees, people conceived by the egg and
sperm of strangers are not reared by their genetic parents. The resulting chil-
dren might, contrary to the Ethics Committee statement, have an experience of
embryo donation that more closely approximates the experience of those who
have been adopted. Nevertheless, the Ethics Committee-some of whose
27. Ibid
28. Joanna Rose, "From a 'bundle of joy' to a person with sorrow: Disenfranchised grief for
the donor-conceived adult" (Paper presented at the Queensland University of Technology
Applied Ethics Seminar Series, 2001) [unpublished], online: <http://eprints.qut.edu.aul737/>.
29. Louise Jamieson, "The DI Journey: Pain, Loss and Discovery" in Who Am I?: Experiences
ofDonor Conception (Warwickshire: Idreos Education Trust, 2006) 30 at 42.
30. The Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, "American
Society for Reproductive Medicine: Defining Embryo Donation" (2009) 92 Fertility &
Sterility 1818 at 1818.
31. Ibid. at 1819.
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members earn money from engaging in embryo donation-states, "The dona-
tion of embryos for reproductive purposes is fundamentally a medical proce-
dure intended to result in pregnancy and should be treated as such."32
Blauwhoff's diligent work is bound to alter the legal landscape by elucidat-
ing in English existing European law and the developing trend of adults re-
questing courts and governments to consider their own needs and desires to
know their parentage. Summarizing this jurisprudence as grounded primarily in
the child's right to autonomy and human dignity, Blauwhoff challenges a nar-
rower, yet popular, perspective.
The popularity of this narrower view is evident also in the governing33 Ca-
nadian federal statute, the Assisted Human Reproduction Act,34 which does not
acknowledge a right to know the identity of one's progenitors. A Charter chal-
lenge, originating in British Columbia and awaiting first instance adjudication,
in effect asserts such a right: it argues that the donor-conceived are similarly
situated to adoptees but unequally treated." In this novel field, Blauwhoffs
diligent work may help Canada to consider and articulate the values that will
guide its own decisions.
Comprehensive in scope and ambitiously undertaken, Blauwhoffs com-
parative law work is a welcome contribution to the literature. To be sure, an
index would have aided readers, and the text is turgid and often difficult to
penetrate. The manuscript ought to have been revised by a native English
speaker. But in this increasingly important field of law concerning whether
children ought to have a right to know their origins, those rare scholars who
read legal texts in four languages, and summarize and analyze them in English,
are to be thanked.
32. Ibid.
33. The Quebec Attorney General has successfully challenged significant portions of this statute
as being ultra vires the Federal Government. See Re Reference by the Government of Quebec
pursuant to the Court ofAppeal Reference Act, R. S. Q, c. R-23, concerning the constitutional
validity of sections 8 to 19, 40 to 53, 61 and 68 of the Assisted Human Reproduction Act, S. C.
2004, c. 2, [20081 R.J.Q. 1551 (C.A.).
34. S.C. 2004, c. 2.
35. "First ever class action lawsuit filed by sperm donor offspring in Canada" Arvay Finlay
Barristers news archive (28 October 2008), online: <http://www.arvayfinlay.com/news/news-
oct28-2008.html>:
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Foundational Facts, Relative Truths deserves respect and a prominent place
on the shelves of those who aim to understand both what is at stake and what
might be achieved when law and policy attempt to address the separation of ge-
netic and social parenting.
